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Economics of Fisheries Management: A Symposium
By
A. D. SCOTT, Editor,

Institute of Animal Resource Ecology,
The University of British Columbia,

Vancouver, Canada.
Price Unknown.

This book contains the papers and prepared commentary presented
at the annual assembly of scholars concerned about fisheries research,
sponsored by the University of British Columbia. For the first time,
the "H. R. MacMillan Lectures in Fisheries" has been extended
beyond the physical domain of the field, a departure which, hopefully,
will be repeated.
In the first of seven papers, James Quirk and Vernon Smith conduct
the reader on an extended tour, using control theory as their vehicle.
Beginning with a simple, general equilibrium number involving risk
and one other good, the tour formally stops with the study of
multispecies; "stops", not "ends", since the level of complexity now is
such that the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium remains to
be proven. The authors conclude that central authority always
performs better than a market economy, unless the fish are no longer
common property.
Myopic analysts, preferring the spatial dimension, will want to
study the Judge and Takayama contribution. Recognizing that
resources and commodities quite rightly are not massed at a point,
they spell out the properties of solutions to different problems cast
within a dynamic programming framework. Their decentralized
decision-making structure is Pareto optimal, because their assumptions effectively remove the physical interdependence commonly observed in the fishery. Given partial equilibrium competitive
conditions, prices differ by transport costs when trading is ubiquitous,
a useful but not surprising conclusion.
Seasonality is the major topic of Paul Bradley's paper. The correct
season length, rate of catch, and units of effort are derived from two
rent maximizing models: one in which a unit of gear makes contact
with a constant population density typified by a stylized in-shore
salmon fishery; the other-basically a Smith-Quirk model-in which
the population is thinned by earlier contact, thereby producing a
Marshallian external diseconomy. In the first instance, a constant unit
tax produces the desired results. In the second case, a daily variable
tax is in order.
Once referred to as "things of the negative community," ownership
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rights of species ferae naturae clearly differ from pieces of property
belonging to the positive community. Steven Cheung's paper helps
the reader to understand better how the richness of actual contracts
brings market performance in common and private property
situations closer together. He thus questions the faddish concern for
externalities. A neat formal description of rent dissipation in the
fishery enhances the paper.
Experienced hands in the field contributed the remaining papers.
Anthony Scott and Clive Southey describe and evaluate a pure
property rights system, a central agency with taxing authority and an
organization employing rules and regulations as alternative guidance
systems. Dubious about the first approach and agnostic about the
remaining two, they caution the reader about second-best decisionmaking which improves one margin, but worsens our lot. James
Crutchfield's vivid portrayal of actual international fisheries provides
gristle for synopticists to chew on. In the real world, where physical
ignorance, political machinations, conflicting expectations and disparate definitions of distributive justice abound, Crutchfield eschews
simplistic nostrums, favoring an overall quota and transferable
national quotas established by an international agency. New entrants
would obtain quotas from a reserve.
Arnold Zellner, in an appropriate final chapter, indicates the
direction for further study: introducing lagged variables; introducing
more species interaction; and making the economic and physical
functions stochastic.
The collection would have been enhanced by a paper which
identified common themes, resolved, or at least specified internal
contradictions, and corrected the more glaring errors and cited
omissions. Fisheries biologists generally obtain population data using
a production function which is homogenous of degree two. If they are
correct, the formal models in this symposium are simply bad science
fiction. If, however, they are wrong, then together we just grope for
an acceptable new structure and new data. Contrasting the practitioners' perceptive views of real fisheries problems with the synopticists' view is a sobering exercise. The optimizers seem barely to have
left port. The symposium makes it clear that much remains to be
done.
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